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 Abstract 
 
This paper tests the effect of systemic risk on deposit market discipline by interacting proxies for 
systemic risk with bank-specific default-risk variables. Discipline is measured by estimating a 
supply of deposit funds function at Thai banks from 1992 to 1997. The results show that supply 
decreases as bank-specific risk increases. Also, the sensitivity of funds to changes in bank-
specific risk increases as systemic risk rises. Additionally, depositors decrease their sensitivity to 
deposit rates, decreasing the ability of banks to offset deposit drains by raising rates. Although 
banking system risk increases, discipline decreases the share of deposits at the riskiest banks. 
 
JEL Classifications: E53, E44, G28, G21 
Key Words: Market discipline, market monitoring, systemic risk, banking and currency 
crises 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
Economists often promote the ability of market discipline to mitigate banking system 
risk. However, as systemic risk rises it can affect the degree of market discipline (see 
Gilbert, 1983, for theory and empirical evidence). Exploring effects of systemic risk on 
discipline is important to stability. As systemic risk rises, one would hope that discipline 
is maintained. However, there is no evidence on whether discipline changes under this 
environment. Despite the likelihood of a connection between systemic risk and discipline, 
systemic risk is usually treated as a control variable in the literature. The present study 
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tests the effect of increasing systemic risk on market discipline at Thai banks before the 
1997 currency crisis.1 Discipline has been traditionally defined as risk pricing of banks by 
liability holders. Recently discipline has included the quantity responses of the market to 
bank-specific measures of default risk. At least one of these two concepts of discipline is 
imbedded into almost every market discipline study (e.g., see Flannery, 1998; Flannery 
and Nikolova, 2004 for reviews of the literature). More recent literature has distinguished 
market monitoring from market influence, where the latter reduces risky behavior, 
leading to lower banking system risk (Bliss and Flannery, 2001). Furthermore, Covitz et 
al. (2004) find the evidence that market discipline only appears in the periods after 
government guarantees are reduced. Even though our paper shows evidence of depositor 
monitoring, banking system risk increases. However, this does not mean that monitoring 
has not mitigated systemic risk to some extent. Additionally, we do show that depositors 
pulled funds from the riskiest banks, decreasing their share of banking system deposits. 
This decreases banking system risk from what it would have been in the absence of 
monitoring. This is the sense in which we define discipline. Discipline in this form can 
contribute to preserving the soundness of the banking system. 
 
In this paper, we emphasize the risk of withdrawal of short-term deposits from the 
banking system. The focus on this type of risk follows from the financial crisis literature, 
which argues that systemic risk arising from heavy short-term borrowing contributed to 
the financial and currency crises in Latin America and East Asia (Bernard and Bisignano 
2000). Although this borrowing differs among countries in these regions, Thailand is 
often cited as an example. Thus, this paper’s focus on Thai banks should be appropriate. 
 
The effect of the withdrawal of short-term funds on any particular bank depends not only 
on its exposure to those funds, but on its overall condition. Thus, as systemic risk 
increases depositors have incentives to monitor banks more in an attempt to sort out the 
                                                 
1
 Partour and Plantin (2008) examine the impact of securitization on bank incentives to monitor borrowers, 
which is the other side of market discipline. Additionally, Cerasi and Rochet (2014) construct a model 
where banks play an active role in monitoring borrowers. However, this is beyond our scope of analysis, 
and we leave it for future research. 
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effect of this risk on individual banks. Discipline in this environment can take two forms, 
depending on how systemic risk rises or whether it reaches some critical level.  
 
First, depositors might attempt to use bank-specific risk measures to discipline banks 
more intensely. Second, to gauge bank-specific condition as systemic risk rises, 
depositors might require more accurate and timelier information. This can lead depositors 
to increase monitoring of ratios with the highest information content under a high risk 
environment (Levy et al. 2010).2  
 
Using data on the Thai banking system in the pre-crisis period from 1992Q4 to 1997Q2,3 
we measure discipline by estimating a supply function for deposit funds. Unlike other 
discipline studies, estimating a supply function allows a test of the consistency of the 
results with theoretical models of a deposit market (Park and Peristiani 1998).4  
 
The next section introduces four measures of systemic risk for Thailand. Section 3 
presents the econometric model of deposit funds supply, the data and the results. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
 
2.    Systemic Risk of Withdrawal of Short-Term Funds in Thailand 
  
The adverse effect of short-term funds withdrawal can be measured through the product 
of exposure to short-term borrowing and the probability of these funds being withdrawn. 
Exposure can be measured as short-term interbank deposits at each bank. Exposure 
increased from 4.5% of banking system liabilities in1992 to 20% in 1997 at 15 Thai 
                                                 
2
 Abandoning monitoring would mean the complete withdrawal of funds from banks. This is a type of 
discipline, but can only be measured relative to deposit alternatives at other institutions. We do not directly 
address deposit shifting among institutions, but controls for these shifts econometrically by utilizing time-
fixed effects.  
3
 While it might be interesting to examine the post-crisis period to see how depositors sorted out bank risk 
as banks continued to deteriorate, the government give full guarantees to all banks and some banks were 
taken over by the government. Consequently, the measurement of discipline would be complicated. See 
Peria and Schmukler (2001) for a pre-crisis and post-crisis comparison of discipline in three Latin 
American countries. 
4
 Park and Peristiani (1998), argue that risk pricing reflects depositor monitoring responses if information 
on bank condition is transparent, accurate and timely. If information is not transparent and depositors do 
not all have equal access to the same information on bank-specific risk, deposit quantities may also reflect 
default risk. A positive-sloped supply of deposit funds results from this dispersion of information.. 
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banks. To test the hypothesis that rising systemic risk affected discipline, we interact our 
four measures of probability of default with bank-specific measures of default risk, 
including exposure. The first measure of probability of default is a time dummy variable 
for the last year before the crisis (DUMYR). The second indicator is the implicit rate on 
short-term borrowing for the banking system (IMPLBORRTt-1).5 The third indicator is 
the index of Thai bank stock prices (SETBANKt).6 Finally, we use the 6-month Thai baht 
forward rate (THBFORt) as a fourth indicator of the systemic risk of withdrawal.  
 
3.   Empirical Model, Data and Results 
 
3.1    Empirical Model 
 
We test whether systemic risk affects depositor discipline. We also interact the above-
mentioned proxies of systemic risk with indicators of bank-specific default risk. We use a 
market supply and demand framework specified as follows, 
 
(DEPGRit)supply = β1(DEPRATEit) + γ1(BANK-SPECIFIC RISKit-1) + δ1(CONTROLit-1, i, t)  
+ β2[(DEPRATEit)(SYSTRISKt)] + γ2[(BANK-SPECIFIC RISKit-1)(SYSTRISKt)]  
+ δ2[(CONTROLit-1)(SYSTRISKt)] + εit     (1) 
 
where the four-quarter real growth of deposits (DEPGRit) is a function of the rate on 
deposits of 6-month maturity (DEPRATEit) for the ith bank.7 Deposit growth is also a 
function of a vector of bank-specific default risk indicators (BANK-SPECIFIC RISKit-1) 
that are lagged one period to mitigate endogeneity problems. This vector includes a 
measure of general bank risk (return on equity [ROEit-1]), three measures of asset risk 
                                                 
5
 This is calculated as banking system interest expenses on short-term funds divided by the average value of 
short-term borrowing in the banking system.  
6
 This index is a weighted average of the market capitalization of Thai banks. 
7
 Ideally, the econometric model should use data on the quantities of 6-month deposits. However, only data 
for total bank deposits are available. We use two proxies for DEPGR: the four-quarter growth rate in total 
real deposits (DEPGR2) and an implicit deposit growth rate (DEPGR1), computed by taking total deposit 
interest expenses for each bank and dividing this by a bank’s posted 6-month deposit rate. The latter 
measure is probably a better indication of interest-sensitive deposit growth than the former. The latter 
measure is used in Tables 2-6. DEPGR2 yields qualitatively similar results. The correlation coefficient 
between the two measures is 0.555. The deposit rate is used instead of the spread between the deposit and 
risk-free rate because use of the spread implicitly assumes that the coefficient on the risk-free rate is unity.    
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(loan-to-asset ratio [LNASit-1], foreclosure-to-asset ratio [FORCLSASit-1], and cash-to-
asset ratio [CASit-1]) and a measure of leverage (a bank’s computed franchise value 
[FRANKit-1]).8 This vector also includes a measure of bank-specific exposure to short-
term funds (the ratio of foreign interbank borrowing-to-liabilities [EXPOSit-1]). We 
employ a vector of firm-specific and time-specific control variables (CONTROLit-1, i, t). 
The control variables include the logarithm of real assets (LOGASit-1), firm-fixed effects 
dummy variables (DUMFFi) and time fixed-effects dummy variables (DUMTIMEt).9 
 
To test the hypothesis that discipline changes with changes in systemic risk, the above-
mentioned bank-specific measures are interacted with each of the four measures of 
systemic risk (SYSTRISKt). Since each of these four measures are a proxy for the 
systemic risk of short-term funds withdrawal, only one measure at a time is included in 
each of four regression equations. These measures consist of a time-dummy variable for 
the last year before the crisis (DUMYR), the implicit borrowing rate for short-term 
foreign funds (IMPLBORRTt-1), the stock price index of Thai commercial banks 
(SETBANKt), and the 6-month forward rate on the Thai baht (THBFORt).10  
 
The deposit supply function is estimated using the two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
technique. Since all 15 of the Thai banks included in the sample are engaged in a similar 
                                                 
8
 The franchise value of capital is computed as in Keeley (1990). The balance sheet measure of capital is 
probably not an appropriate measure of leverage monitored by depositors. There is little variation in this 
ratio between banks or over time. This ratio also rises in the last year before the crisis, whereas and the 
franchise value and the market capital-to-asset ratio fall. When included in our estimates of deposit supply, 
the leverage ratio often yields a wrong sign or is insignificant. This is a typical result in the literature (see 
e.g., Mondschean and Opiela 1999). We used the franchise value in the reported regression estimates. 
Coefficients on the market capital-to-asset ratio are of similar sign and significance. The ratio of provisions 
for loan losses to total loans is more than likely not a good measure of loan quality. As Table 1 indicates, 
this ratio was extremely small and varied little over time and across banks. Provisioning standards forced 
banks to set aside loan loss reserves only after a loan had not been repaid for 1 year. Provisioning 
regulations were changed to meet international standards only in the last year before the crisis. Initial 
attempts to use this ratio yielded the wrong sign or an insignificant coefficient. Interacting a dummy 
variable for the last year when provisioning laws changed yields the correct sign. As an alternative proxy 
for loan quality we use the ratio of foreclosures to assets. This ratio represents actual foreclosures on 
properties. As Table 1 indicates, this ratio is much larger than provisioning to loans and its standard 
deviation among banks changes substantially in the last year before the crisis. The correlation between the 
loan-loss provisions ratio and foreclosures ratio is near zero. 
9
 The time-fixed effects play an important role. If there are shifts in deposit funds between institutions, 
time-fixed effects should control for this shift. Thus, even if deposits are not fleeing the banking system as 
systemic risk increases, estimates of equation (1) should still measure discipline among banks. 
10
 The reciprocal of SETBANK is used in regression equation (1). 
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business, they are more than likely affected by common shocks. Although several bank-
specific and systemic variables are included, it is reasonable to assume that these banks 
form a set of imperfectly-pooled seemingly unrelated (SUR) regressions. Using the SUR 
technique should mitigate omitted variable bias and provide more efficient estimates. A 
test of the correlation matrix of residuals formed from the least squares regressions shows 
that the assumption of zero contemporaneous cross-correlations among the residuals can 
be rejected at the 1% level. Consequently, we use cross-section SUR weights in each 
stage of a TSLS process to estimate the supply of deposit funds.  
 
The variables DEPGR and DEPRATE are assumed to be endogenous. All other variables 
are assumed to be exogenous. Three exogenous bank-specific deposit demand shifters are 
included. The deviation of a bank’s quoted prime loan rate from the industry average 
(MLRDEVit) is a proxy for the bank’s loan opportunities. An increase in this rate should 
increase the demand for deposits. The ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets 
(NIEXPASit) is a proxy for operating costs of the bank per baht of assets. An increase in 
this cost decreases the demand for deposits.11 The share of liabilities that a bank has in 
deposits (DEPLIABit) is an indicator of a bank’s dependence on deposits for funding 
assets. An increase in this variable should increase the demand for deposits in the current 
period. Since all three demand shifters are known by banks in the current period, but 
revealed to the public only in the subsequent period, there is little likelihood that they 
affect deposit supply. These three demand shifters are used along with all other 
exogenous variables as instruments in the first stage of the TSLS/SUR regressions.       
 
3.2    Data 
 
We employ a quarterly panel from 1992Q4 to 1997Q2 that includes 15 Thai commercial 
banks. Real quantities are computed using the CPI for all items. Balance sheet and 
income statement data for Thai banks and the market capitalization of each bank was 
used to compute the franchise value and market capital leverage ratio, and were obtained 
from the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Deposit rates on 6-month savings at commercial 
                                                 
11
 This ratio could also be viewed as a measure of efficiency or a measure of services provided. With any of 
these interpretations, increases in this ratio should decrease a bank’s demand for deposits.  
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banks were obtained from the Bank of Thailand. The Thai bank stock index and the 
baht/USD 6-month forward rate were obtained from Bloomberg.  
 
3.3   Results  
    
Tables 1-4 report the results of the four estimated deposit funds supply functions, where 
each regression interacts one of the four measures of systemic risk with all bank-specific 
variables. Initially, we focus on the total monitoring response by depositors for evidence 
of discipline when systemic risk is included in the regressions.  
 
TABLE 1 
Supply of Deposit Funds Estimation (TSLS/SUR), Dependent Variable = DEPGR1 
DUMYR is interacted with Bank-Specific Variables 
(DUMYR, =1 for period 1996Q3-1997Q2 and = 0 otherwise)) 
 
Independent Variablea Coefficient / (t-statistic) 
1st Period Effect  
1993Q1-1996Q2 
Coefficient /     
 (t-statistic) 
Interaction w/ DUMYR 
Coefficient/ 
(Chi-Square statistic)  
Total Effect 
Bank-Specific Risk Variables    
FRANK (t-1) 63.960* 
(1.758) 
107.749** 
(2.192) 
171.709*** 
(17.301) 
CAS(t-1) 365.940*** 
(5.727) 
150.218* 
(1.731) 
516.158*** 
(7.281) 
ROE(t-1) 55.578*** 
(2.855) 
-28.274 
(-1.170) 
27.304** 
(4.898) 
FORCLSAS (t-1) -1586.583*** 
(-5.351) 
1566.881** 
(2.194) 
-19.702 
(0.000815) 
EXPOS(t-1) -134.851*** 
(-4.518) 
-25.677 
(-0.565) 
-160.528*** 
(12.894) 
LNAS(t-1) 103.115 
(1.150) 
-26.666 
(-0.220) 
76.449 
(0.445) 
Control Variables    
LOGAS(t-1) 57.964** 
(2.418) 
-1.341 
(-0.294) 
56.622** 
(4.316) 
Slope of Deposit Supply    
DEPRATE(t) 28.393** 
(2.308) 
-23.742** 
(-2.247) 
4.651 
(0.898) 
Hypothesis Testb    
Null Hypothesis: Bank-specific 
risk variables=0 
(283.788)*** 
 
(12.051)* (66.799)*** 
 
 
a
 t-statistics are in parentheses in columns 2 and 3. Chi-Squared statistics are in parenthesis in column 4. * = significant at 
10% level, ** = significant at 5% level and *** = significant at 1% level. Coefficient estimates on the firm and time-fixed 
effects regressors are not included in the above table, but are available on request. 
b
 Chi-squared statistics in parentheses. 
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This total effect, appearing in the last column of Tables 1-4, is of the correct sign and 
significant for almost every bank-specific default risk variable. The hypothesis test of 
whether the bank-specific risk variables are jointly equal to zero, appearing at the bottom 
of each table, is rejected for each of the four regressions. This is evidence of discipline.  
TABLE 2 
Supply of Deposit Funds Estimation (TSLS/SUR), Dependent Variable = DEPGR1 
(IMPLBORRTt-1 is interacted with Bank-Specific Variables) 
 
Independent Variable a Coefficient /       
(t-statistic) 
Own Effect 
Coefficient /(t-statistic) 
Interaction w/ 
IMPLBORRT 
Coefficient/ 
(Chi-Square statistic)  
Total Effect 
Bank-Specific Risk Variables    
FRANK (t-1) -111.817*** 
(-2.808) 
74.057*** 
(5.146) 
62.538*** 
(15.976) 
CAS(t-1) 368.829*** 
(2.811) 
-9.767 
(-0.203) 
345.835*** 
(55.447) 
ROE(t-1) 27.585 
(0.811) 
3.470 
(0.248) 
35.755*** 
(22.441) 
FORCLSAS (t-1) 970.983 
(1.486) 
-782.477*** 
(-2.927) 
-871.245*** 
(13.960) 
EXPOS(t-1) -135.239*** 
(-7.380) 
-7.076* 
(-1.920) 
-151.898*** 
(88.371) 
LNAS(t-1) 130.054 
(1.507) 
-25.450 
(-0.755) 
70.136** 
(5.546) 
Control Variables    
LOGAS(t-1) 51.643*** 
(7.079) 
-4.112*** 
(-3.443) 
41.960*** 
(25.071) 
Slope of Deposit Supply    
DEPRATE(t) 27.592*** 
(3.148) 
-7.192*** 
(-3.248) 
10.660** 
(5.357) 
Hypothesis Test b    
Null Hypothesis: Bank-
specific risk variables=0 
----- (56.276)*** (316.315)*** 
 
a
 t-statistics are in parentheses in columns 2 and 3. Chi-Squared statistics are in parenthesis in column 4. * = significant at 
10% level, ** = significant at 5% level and *** = significant at 1% level. Coefficient estimates on the firm and time-fixed 
effects regressors are not included in the above table, but are available on request. 
b
 Chi-squared statistics in parentheses. 
  
 
Next, we turn to the effect of increasing systemic risk on depositor discipline, which is 
the main focus of this paper. This effect is measured by observing the coefficients 
associated with the interaction of our proxies for systemic risk with each bank-specific 
measure of risk. This effect is reported in the second column of Tables 1-4. An increase 
in systemic risk strengthens the direct relationship between deposit growth and, both the 
franchise value (FRANK) and the cash-to-asset (CAS) ratios. This can be seen from the 
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positive and significant coefficients in each of the four regressions for the proxy for 
capital and three of the four regressions for the cash ratio. This result is consistent with 
the often cited expectation that depositors flee to banks with the highest capital and  
 
TABLE 3 
Supply of Deposit Funds Estimation (TSLS/SUR), Dependent Variable = DEPGR1 
(SETBANK
 t is interacted with Bank-Specific Variables) 
 
Independent Variable a Coefficient /       
(t-statistic) 
Own Effect 
Coefficient /(t-statistic) 
Interaction w/ 
SETBANK 
Coefficient/ 
(Chi-Square statistic)  
Total Effect 
Bank-Specific Risk Variables    
FRANK (t-1) -136.460*** 
(-4.051) 
187.329*** 
(5.015) 
33.382** 
(5.361) 
CAS(t-1) -1322.822*** 
(-11.211) 
1970.688*** 
(14.657) 
463.903*** 
(157.122) 
ROE(t-1) 139.799*** 
(4.990) 
-99.166*** 
(-3.863) 
49.890*** 
(50.482) 
FORCLSAS (t-1) -4205.571*** 
(-5.577) 
3043.040*** 
(4.230) 
-1446.600*** 
(54.114) 
EXPOS(t-1) -190.263*** 
(-14.597) 
31.686*** 
(3.251) 
-161.535*** 
(158.304) 
LNAS(t-1) 0.239 
(0.00363) 
25.495 
(0.403) 
23.353 
(0.858) 
Control Variables    
LOGAS(t-1) 38.092*** 
(4.254) 
-3.841* 
(-1.826) 
34.610*** 
(15.035) 
Slope of Deposit Supply    
DEPRATE(t) 36.112*** 
(7.272) 
-18.791** 
(-6.992) 
19.075*** 
(36.027) 
Hypothesis Test b    
Null Hypothesis: Bank-
specific risk variables=0 
----- (295.284)*** (569.019)*** 
 
a
 t-statistics are in parentheses in columns 2 and 3. Chi-Squared statistics are in parenthesis in column 4. * = significant at 
10% level, ** = significant at 5% level and *** = significant at 1% level. Coefficient estimates on the firm and time-fixed 
effects regressors are not included in the above table, but are available on request. 
b
 Chi-squared statistics in parentheses. 
  
liquidity, as systemic risk rises and the banking system weakens (see e.g., Kaufman and 
Scott 2003, and Nier and Baumann 2003).  
 
Increases in systemic risk weaken the relationship between deposit growth and both 
foreclosures to assets (FORCLSAS) and the return on equity (ROE). This result is 
apparent by the positive and significant coefficients on the interaction term of 
FORCLSAS in two of the four equations, and a negative coefficient for ROE in two of 
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the regressions. It is intuitive that the monitoring of these ratios decreases given that they 
contain dated information, which probably lacks relevance in gauging bank-specific 
default risk in an environment of rapidly increasing systemic risk. This result is consistent 
with other discipline studies. For example, Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) show that as  
TABLE 4 
Supply of Deposit Funds Estimation (TSLS/SUR), Dependent Variable = DEPGR1 
(THBFOR
 t is interacted with Bank-Specific Variables) 
 
Independent Variable a Coefficient /       
(t-statistic) 
Own Effect 
Coefficient /(t-statistic) 
Interaction w/ 
THBFOR 
Coefficient/ 
(Chi-Square statistic)  
Total Effect 
Bank-Specific Risk Variables    
FRANK(t-1) -1515.977** 
(-2.279) 
61.144** 
(2.371) 
63.846*** 
(28.258) 
CAS(t-1) -4428.854 
(-1.456) 
184.095* 
(1.755) 
327.710*** 
(62.895) 
ROE(t-1) 1171.797** 
(2.202) 
-43.150** 
(-2.135) 
56.900*** 
(23.295) 
FORCLSAS (t-1) -21481.130*** 
(-2.839) 
778.623* 
(1.846) 
-1120.126*** 
(30.293) 
EXPOS(t-1) -337.046** 
(-2.340) 
7.040 
(1.272) 
-155.151*** 
(120.870) 
LNAS(t-1) 2423.655** 
(2.251) 
-93.076** 
(-2.218) 
18.796 
(0.547) 
Control Variables    
LOGAS(t-1) -6.751 
(-0.221) 
2.523** 
(2.127) 
58.426*** 
(15.035) 
Slope of Deposit Supply    
DEPRATE(t) 95.410** 
(2.382) 
-3.158** 
(-2.117) 
13.816*** 
(51.398) 
Hypothesis Test b    
Null Hypothesis: Bank-
specific risk variables=0 
----- (67.635)*** (493.938)*** 
 
a
 t-statistics are in parentheses in columns 2 and 3. Chi-Squared statistics are in parenthesis in column 4. * = significant at 
10% level, ** = significant at 5% level and *** = significant at 1% level. Coefficient estimates on the firm and time-fixed 
effects regressors are not included in the above table, but are available on request. 
b
 Chi-squared statistics in parentheses. 
 
  
banks in the U.S. weaken, ROE becomes insignificant in monitoring. Levy, Peria et al. 
(2004) show that as risk rises in Argentina and Uruguay, non-performing loans lose their 
predictive power in monitoring. As argued earlier, this result should not be viewed as a 
decrease in monitoring, but rather a shift in depositor emphasis from those variables that 
have little information content under rising systemic risk to those variables that do. In the 
case of this study, depositors are shifting away from FORCLSAS and ROE and, towards 
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CAS and FRANK. The remaining two bank-specific risk variables (EXPOS and LNAS) 
show no definite pattern of change as systemic risk rises.   
 
The results in our paper show that depositor funds are responsive to bank-specific 
measures of risk. This characterizes what we call market discipline, which is also 
consistent with the results of other studies of discipline.12 Additionally, increasing 
systemic risk increased the rate at which depositors pulled funds from the riskier banks. 
In particular, deposits were more sensitive to differences in bank net worth and liquidity 
as systemic risk rose. Depositors also moved away from the use of variables that, in 
general, contained little information in a rising systemic risk environment (i.e., return on 
equity and a dated measure of loan quality). However, as systemic risk rose, the 
sensitivity of deposit growth to deposit rates decreased. This indicates that depositors 
forced banks to pay higher rates than before to maintain deposit growth in the face of 
deposit drains due to deteriorating bank health. This further supports the contention that 
depositors intensified their demands on banks as systemic risk increased.  
 
4.   Conclusion 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis that systemic risk affected deposit market discipline at 
Thai banks in the pre-crisis period from 1992 to 1997. We choose measures of systemic 
risk that proxy for the probability of the withdrawal of short-term foreign funds from the 
banking system. In this paper we estimate the effect of systemic risk on discipline by 
interacting these measures of systemic risk with bank-specific default risk variables. 
Additionally, market discipline is measured in the context of estimating a function for the 
supply of deposit funds. This latter approach allows a test of the consistency of the results 
with theoretical models of a deposit market and facilitates testing the effect of systemic 
risk on discipline.  
 
                                                 
12
 After the financial crisis, we expect that market discipline will be weakening if there are regulatory 
changes in the banking system. This phenomenon is reported by Hadad et al. (2011) who find that market 
discipline  at Indonesian banks decreases after introducing new regulations. 
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The results of this paper show that market discipline exists at banks in pre-crisis 
Thailand. That is, the supply of deposit funds decrease at the riskiest banks. There is also 
strong evidence that increases in systemic risk increase the rate at which depositors pull 
funds from the riskiest banks. In particular, as systemic risk increases, depositors move 
their funds to banks that have higher net worth and are more liquid than other banks. 
Additionally, depositors place less emphasis on profitability and measures of asset quality 
-dated measures that often convey little information about bank condition as systemic risk 
rises. There is no evidence that depositors flee to large banks, which questions the 
conventional wisdom that depositors perceive increasing government guarantees as the 
crisis approaches. Finally, the sensitivity of deposit growth to deposit rates is positive, but 
decreases as systemic risk increases. This is a further sign that depositors force banks to 
pay higher premia for bank efforts to maintain deposits in the face of deteriorating 
fundamentals.  
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